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During the so-called Free Banking Era (1837-63), an 
important feature of the state laws that established free 
banking was the protection of noteholders. In many free 
banking states, noteholders not only had state bonds 
securing their notes but also had first lien on the rest of a 
bank's assets. In some states, they could even hold bank 
owners accountable for losses up to the original value of 
their equity. It was clearly a system designed to create a 
reasonably safe private medium of exchange. 
The system, however, did not always perform as 
intended. At times, banks failed without holding enough 
resources to pay off their noteholders. In Minnesota, for 
example, some free banks could only pay noteholders 
16 cents on the dollar.
1 While noteholders in other 
states fared much better, free bank notes were clearly 
risky. Consequently, they appear to have been domi-
nated in rate of return by specie (gold and silver coin) as 
a medium of exchange. Why, then, were bank notes 
demanded, circulating in most states at or close to par? 
The conventional answer to this question is that the 
demand for these notes at par came from a naive or 
misinformed public who simply accepted all free bank 
notes as perfectly safe claims to specie. In this paper we 
propose a much different answer. We argue that the 
demand for free bank notes came from a reasonably 
well-informed public who treated these notes as small-
denomination securities. As a result, the price of free 
bank notes was not necessarily equal to their par value 
but rather reflected the expected value of the assets 
backing them. Specifically, we argue that when free 
banks backed their notes with relatively safe bonds and 
other good assets so that the probability of default was 
very small, their notes initially sold and then exchanged 
at par. However, when free banks backed their notes 
only with risky bonds so that the probability of default 
was significant, their notes initially sold and then 
exchanged well below par. 
Generally, we find that the empirical evidence is 
consistent with our explanation. In most instances 
because of their backing, free bank notes were roughly 
as safe as specie, and we find these notes exchanging at 
or close to par. In a few cases, however, the backing of 
free bank notes was insufficient to support par pricing. 
In these cases, empirical evidence is consistent with the 
contention that the public were well informed and 
treated these bank notes as small-denomination securi-
ties which were issued and exchanged well below par. 
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21 The paper proceeds as follows. To begin, we illus-
trate the potential risk associated with free bank notes 
by briefly discussing the regulations under which a free 
bank operated. We then consider two types of experi-
ences to test whether or not prices of free bank notes 
reflected this risk. First, we consider the experiences of 
New York, Wisconsin, and Indiana, where the backing 
of free bank notes was quite safe. We find that the notes 
of banks in these states circulated close to par. Second, 
we consider the experience of Minnesota, where many 
free bank notes were very poorly backed. Here the 
evidence suggests that these notes circulated well 
below par; thus priced, they presumably were de-
manded because they offered their holders an expected 
return to compensate for risk. Finally, we present a 
summary and some of the implications of our findings. 
Free Banking Regulations 
and Potential Note Risk 
Most U.S. free banking laws were patterned on the laws 
passed by the New York legislature. That state's 
original free banking act, passed on April 18, 1838, 
contained two major provisions intended to provide a 
high degree of bank note safety: 
• A 100 percent state bond reserve. Notes were to be backed 
by "public debt now created or hereafter to be created by 
the United States or by this State, or such other States of 
the United States as shall be approved by the comptroller, 
... but such public debt shall in all cases be, or be made 
to be, equal to a stock [bond] of the state producing five 
per cent per annum; and it shall not be lawful for the 
comptroller to take any stock at a rate above its par value" 
(ch. 260, sec. 2). 
• Par redemption. If a bank refused to redeem any of its 
notes, "the comptroller shall . . . give notice in the state 
paper that all the circulating notes issued by such person or 
association will be redeemed out of the trust funds in his 
hands for that purpose; and it shall be lawful for the 
comptroller to apply the said trust funds belonging to the 
maker or makers of such protested notes, to the payment 
and redemption of such notes, with costs of protest, and to 
adopt such measures for the payment of all such circu-
lating notes put in circulation by the maker or makers of 
such protested notes, pursuant to the provisions of this act, 
as will, in his opinion, most effectually prevent loss to the 
holders thereof" (ch. 260, sec. 4). 
Since the first provision would not provide 100 
percent backing if bonds were selling below par, the 
New York law was amended on May 14, 1840, to 
prohibit the comptroller from accepting a state bond "at 
a rate above its par value, nor above its current marked 
value" (ch. 363, sec. 1). Further, the new constitution of 
the state, adopted in 1846, included two additional 
provisions to reduce bank note risk: 
• Extended stockholder liability. "The stockholders in every 
corporation and joint stock association for banking pur-
poses, issuing bank notes or any kind of paper credits to 
circulate as money, after the first day of January, one 
thousand eight hundred and fifty, shall be individually 
responsible to the amount of their respective share or 
shares of stock in any such corporation or association, for 
all its debts and liabilities of every kind, contracted after 
the said first day of January, one thousand eight hundred 
and fifty" (art. 8, sec. 7). 
• First lien. "In case of the insolvency of any bank or banking 
association, the bill-holders thereof shall be entitled to 
preference in payment, over all other creditors of such 
bank association" (art. 8, sec. 8). 
As an illustration of how a hypothetical free bank 
operated under these laws, consider a potential banker 
with $50,000 of capital. To establish a free bank, that 
person would buy state bonds with this capital, deposit 
the bonds with the state auditor, and receive in ex-
change $50,000 of bank notes that the new bank could 
issue. Presumably, these notes would get into circula-
tion by being exchanged for other assets (for example, 
loans, specie, or more state bonds). 
The safety of the free bank's notes would depend on 
how these notes got into circulation. Suppose, for 
example, that our hypothetical free banker exchanged 
the $50,000 of bank notes for $40,000 of loans and 
$10,000 of specie. The balance sheet of the free bank 
would then look like Table 1. Given the extended 
stockholder liability and first lien provisions, note-
holders would experience no loss even if the value of 
loans and state bonds fell to zero. 
Now suppose, however, that our free banker ex-
changed the initial $50,000 of notes not for loans or 
specie but rather for another $50,000 of state bonds for 
which the state auditor provided another $50,000 of 
notes. Finally, those notes were used to purchase 
$40,000 of loans and $10,000 of specie. The balance 
sheet of this free bank would look like Table 2. Here, 
even with the extended stockholder liability and first 
lien provisions in effect, noteholders would suffer a loss 
if the value of state bonds plus loans fell below $40,000. 
Thus, the provisions of the free banking laws were 
not sufficient to guarantee that free bank notes would 
always be fully backed. In fact, available evidence 
suggests that free bank noteholders did suffer losses. 
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Demand for Free Bank Notes 
Tables 1 and 2 
Balance Sheets of a Hypothetical Free Bank 
Table 1 With Perfectly Safe Notes 
Assets  Liabilities and Capital 
State Bonds  $ 50,000  Liabilities: 
Notes Outstanding  $ 50,000 
Loans  40,000 
Specie  10,000  Capital  50,000 
Total  $100,000  Total  $100,000 
Table 2 With Risky Notes 
Assets  Liabilities and Capital 
State Bonds  $100,000  Liabilities: 
Notes Outstanding  $100,000 
Loans  40,000 
Specie  10,000  Capital  50,000 
Total  $150,000  Total  $150,000 
Noteholder Losses and Note Demand 
We now explore how large these losses were and why 
individuals held free bank notes when such losses were 
possible. 
In New York, Wisconsin, and Indiana 
For three states where data were readily available-
New York, Wisconsin, and Indiana—the intended 
objective of the free banking laws was achieved: free 
bank notes there were relatively safe and exchanged 
close to par. 
Evidence to support the claim that free bank notes in 
New York, Wisconsin, and Indiana were relatively safe 
is presented in Table 3. The evidence shows that if free 
bank notes in these states were accepted at par, the 
losses were very small (that is, the rates of return on 
these notes were very close to zero). In New York, the 
loss was 0.03 percent per year or less in all but three of 
the eighteen years for which we can calculate rates of 
return. In those three years, the loss was about half a 
percent per year or less. In Wisconsin, the rate of return 
was zero in all years except 1860 and 1861, when all of 
Wisconsin's free bank failures occurred. Indiana expe-
rienced losses of about 7.5 and 5 percent per year in 
1853 and 1854, but after that, losses were quite small. 
Evidence to support the claim that bank notes 
circulated close to par comes from contemporary bank 
note reporters. These reporters indicate that free bank 
notes generally circulated at par in the geographical 
area near the bank of issue, while outside this area notes 
were discounted. (For example, notes of Indiana free 
banks were discounted in Philadelphia.) However, 
these discounts were small, reflecting the costs that 
would have to be incurred to redeem the notes in 
specie.
2 
In Minnesota: A Different Experience 
The free banking experience of Minnesota seems to 
have been quite different from that of New York, 
Wisconsin, and Indiana. This difference is dramatically 
illustrated in Table 4, where rates of return on 
Minnesota free bank notes are calculated under the 
assumption that they circulated at par. These calcula-
tions show that noteholder losses would have been very 
large: approximately 50 percent per year during early 
and mid-1859, and between 12 and 18 percent per year 
during late 1859 and all of 1860. 
Such large losses raise the following question: If the 
public were well informed and knew the risks involved 
in accepting Minnesota currency, why would they have 
accepted these notes at par? Specie and notes of banks 
from other states should have clearly dominated notes 
of Minnesota free banks. Consequently, Minnesota free 
2The demand for free bank notes is even less surprising since U.S. coinage 
laws did not provide for the reminting of underweight coins. As a result, gold 
and silver coins of this period may also have had a negative rate of return. 
Jevons (1918, pp. 154-55) points out: 
Some attention must be given to the abrasion which coins suffer in use. In 
the case of gold coins the loss of metal thus occasioned is of importance, 
and leads ... to a gradual depreciation of the currency. As coins pass 
frequently from hand to hand, the amount of metal abraded will be nearly 
the same as regards each coin of the same type, and each year of circulation. 
The loss will be proportional to length of wear. 
Jevons (1918, pp. 155-56) then estimates the rate of depreciation on an English 
gold sovereign (roughly equivalent to a U.S. $5 gold coin) at about 0.035 
percent per year and that of a half sovereign at about 0.112 percent per year. 
Seaman (1850, p. 165, note) estimates the loss on coins of all kinds due to 
"friction" to be "more than one-tenth of 1 percent annually." A comparison of 
these rates of loss on specie coins with those on New York, Wisconsin, and 
Indiana bank notes in Table 3 suggests that in most years these notes were as 
safe or safer than specie. The same argument was made by King (1983, p. 148) 
in his evaluation of the riskiness of notes issued by New York's free banks. 
23 Tables 3 and 4 
Annual Rates of Return on Free Bank Notes 
on Selected Dates* 
(in percent) 
Table 3 In New York, Wisconsin, and Indiana 
New York  Nov. 1843  -0.19  Dec. 1853  0 
Nov. 1844  0  Sept. 1854  -0.03 
Nov. 1845  0  Sept. 1855  0 
Nov. 1846  0  Sept. 1856  -0.03 
Feb. 1847  0  Sept. 1857  -0.01 
Mar. 1848  -0.52  Dec. 1858  0 
Dec. 1849  0  Dec. 1859  0 
Dec. 1850  -0.16  Dec. 1860  -0.02 
June 1852  0  Dec. 1861  0 
Wisconsin  July 1853  0  Jan. 1858  0 
Jan. 1854  0  Jan. 1859  0 
Jan. 1855  0  Jan. 1860  -0.11 
Jan. 1856  0  Jan. 1861  -11.75 
Jan. 1857  0 
Indiana  Dec. 1853  -7.47  Jan. 1859  0 
July 1854  -4.95  July 1859  0 
Jan. 1856  -0.28  Jan. 1860  -1.05 
July 1857  0  Jan. 1861  0 
Jan. 1858  0  Jan. 1862  0 
July 1858  0 
Table 4 In Minnesota 
Jan. 1859  -54.38  Jan. 1860  -12.43 
Apr. 1859  -50.88  Apr. 1860  -15.36 
July 1859  -49.83  July 1860  -18.04 
Oct. 1859  -17.39  Oct. 1860  -15.02 
'Rates of return are calculated by multiplying the circulation of each bank by one if it existed one year later 
and by the redemption rate if it did not, adding these values for all banks, dividing the result by the total 
circulation, subtracting one, and multiplying by 100. 
banks should have had a difficult time circulating their 
currency. 
Yet it appears that Minnesota's free banks did not 
encounter difficulties circulating their notes. Our esti-
mates of the circulation of Minnesota's free bank notes, 
based on the state auditor's records, are presented in 
Table 5. They show that the public may have held up to 
$360,000 of these notes. Given the losses on these 
notes, such a large circulation would seem difficult 
to explain. 
The conventional explanation is that the public 
either were not well informed or were naive in their 
acceptance of Minnesota notes at face value. According 
to this view, most of the public believed that the notes 
were perfectly safe claims to specie either because the 
law protected their interests or because the bank notes 
looked like money.
3 
We present a different explanation here—one that 
does not depend on the public being misinformed or 
naive. Evidence from state historical records and 
newspaper reports suggests these notes did not circulate 
at par but instead at prices well below par—that is, 
prices reflecting their risky backing. At such prices, the 
demand for these notes arose because the public treated 
them as small-denomination securities rather than as 
money. Before presenting our explanation and evi-
dence, though, we need to briefly discuss Minnesota's 
free banking law and its use of a certain type of bond, 
for both play a central role in our argument. 
Minnesota's Free Banking Law 
and Railroad Bonds 
In the summer of 1858, the legislators of the newly 
established state of Minnesota passed a banking law 
which they hoped would stimulate economic growth 
while providing a safe and popular medium of ex-
change. The law, passed on July 26,1858, was modeled 
after New York's free banking law, which allowed free 
entry and unlimited note issue. The law also contained 
New York's provisions for a 100 percent state bond 
reserve, par redemption, extended stockholder liability, 
and first lien. In addition, the assets that Minnesota 
bankers chose to back their notes had to meet the 
following market test for valuation: 
• Market price valuation. The bonds used to secure bank note 
issues were "to be valued at a rate to be estimated and 
governed by the average rate at which such stocks [bonds] 
have been sold in the city of New York" during the six 
months before they were placed with the auditor (ch. 32, 
sec. 5). 
However, a loophole allowing banks to avoid the 
market test was created when the law was amended on 
August 14, 1858: 
3 While Patchin (1917, p. 160) does not state this view explicitly, in 
reporting the redemption rates on free bank failures in Minnesota he claims 
these rates reflected the "heavy losses which the bill-holders of these banks 
were compelled to undergo." Thus, Patchin assumes that the Minnesota public, 
for some unexplained reason, took these notes at par. Rockoff (1975, pp. 107-
10) makes the same assumption in his interpretation of Minnesota's free 
banking experience. 
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Demand for Free Bank Notes 
Table 5 
Minnesota's Free Banks (1858-63) 
Estimated Date  Date of  Total  Estimated  Redemption 
Bank  Bank Closed*  First Issue  Issue**  Circulation!  Backing  Rate (0/S) 
Bank of Rochester  6/20/59  4/20/59  $ 49,400  $ 36,045  Minnesota 7s  16.25 
Bank of Owatonna  7/13/59  3/17/59  35,000  24,680  Minnesota 7s  20.75 
Fillmore County Bank  7/25/59  5/28/59  25,000  6,900  Minnesota 7s  20.00 
Exchange Bank of Glencoe  7/26/59  11/12/58  80,500  58,725  Minnesota 7s  21.25 
Chisago County Bank  9/7/59  3/9/59  33,361  32,286  Minnesota 7s  19.25 
Nicollet County Bank  10/14/59  2/4/59  40,000  12,000  Minnesota 10s  35.00 
Bank of the State of Minnesota  10/20/59  11/11/58  35,000  15,000  Minnesota 8s, 10s  70.00 
Bank of St. Paul  6/22/61  1/15/59  25,000  24,415  Ohio 6s, Minnesota 7s  98.00 
Central Bank  6/28/61  6/9/59  23,000  11,400  Minnesota 7s  30.00 
Farmers' Bank  —  1/20/59  25,000  25,000  Minnesota 8s  — 
La Crosse & La Crescent Bank  —  6/11/59  50,700  24,140  Minnesota 7s  — 
Bank of Red Wing  —  6/29/59  25,000  1,533  Minnesota 7s  — 
Bank of Chatfield  —  7/5/59  50,000  40,907  Minnesota 7s  — 
Peoples' Bank  —  5/27/59  25,905  15,661  Minnesota 7s  — 
State Bank of Minnesota  —  4/9/59  25,000  25,000  Ohio 6s  — 
Winona County Bank  —  5/18/59  25,000  3,863  Minnesota 7s  — 
Total  $572,866  $357,555 
*Date of first bond return after last published balance sheet. 
"Calculated from the ledger of the state auditor. 
tTotal issue minus bonds returned by owners, when available; otherwise, largest circulation reported on a published balance sheet. 
• Current valuation. The market price valuation provision of 
the original law was altered so that "public stocks [bonds] 
issued or to be issued by the United States or the State of 
Minnesota" were to be accepted as backing for notes at 
their "current value" although market price valuation was 
still required for the bonds of other states (ch. 33, sec. 1). 
This loophole was used extensively by those banks who 
backed their notes with so-called railroad bonds, state 
bonds which had a market value well below par. To 
understand why these bonds were valued below par, we 
need to examine their history. 
On March 3, 1857, the U.S. Congress had passed 
what appeared to be a very generous land grant bill for 
Minnesota railroad companies. For each 20 miles of 
completed railroad line along specified routes, the 
companies would receive title to 120 adjacent sections 
of land. Shortly after, Minnesota passed a bill awarding 
four of Minnesota's railroad companies the contracts on 
these routes; it then made all of the land awarded to 
these companies tax-exempt as long as the land 
remained in their possession. 
Railroad proponents were optimistic that after these 
contracts were awarded, the railroads would be built. 
Their optimism, however, was short lived. An economic 
crisis in the summer of 1857 made raising capital very 
difficult for the railroad companies. The land grants 
seemed to be worth much less than the railroad 
proponents had hoped.
4 And since the railroad com-
panies had virtually no other assets except the promise 
of future revenues from an unbuilt, untried railroad line, 
investors were hard to find. 
The difficulty the railroads had in raising capital to 
even start building prompted the state to pass in April 
1858 what was to be known as the "Five Million Loan." 
This bill authorized the state to lend up to $5 million to 
4Folwell (1961, p. 43) cites one company that could not even sell its 
prospective lands at one dollar an acre. 
25 designated railroad companies. This, however, was no 
ordinary loan. Since the legislature was prohibited by 
the state constitution from contracting a debt with any 
individual association or corporation and since the total 
indebtedness of the state could not exceed $250,000, 
some indirect way had to be found to allow state 
support. The legislature decided it could provide special 
Minnesota state bonds to the railroad companies— 
bonds having the "full faith and credit" of the state. This 
phrase meant very little, however, for the bonds were 
backed solely by the railroad companies' ability to pay 
principal and interest. According to Folwell (1961, 
p. 45), "the state was merely to furnish 'accommoda-
tion paper' to wealthy corporations in a pinch for ready 
cash, taking ample security." 
The proponents of this loan went out of their way to 
assure Minnesotans that they would never be obligated 
to pay off the bonds provided to the railroad companies. 
As Folwell (1961, pp. 47-48) reports: 
Sixty-seven members of the two houses united in a 
published statement pledging themselves "individually 
and collectively, to vote against any proposition to levy a 
tax either for the interest or principal of the proposed loan 
of State credit. We claim to have removed all probable 
chance of taxation ... and we shall resist, as one man, any 
proposition of the kind." 
This bill became part of an amendment to Minne-
sota's constitution and therefore needed to be ratified 
by the general public. The official vote was 25,023 for 
and 6,733 against; only in a few rural counties did those 
against outnumber those for the loan. So were born the 
"Five Million Loan" and what were known as the 
Minnesota railroad bonds or, since the bonds carried a 
coupon interest rate of 7 percent, the Minnesota 7s. 
Clearly, the public were well aware of the nature of this 
bond issue and should have been under no illusions 
about its ultimate redemption. 
That the bond issue was popular in Minnesota did 
not necessarily mean the bonds sold well in New York 
or other money centers. Investors outside Minnesota 
were very skeptical, as they should have been, of the 
state's role in providing its full-faith-and-credit label to 
these bonds. More important, they obviously ques-
tioned the ability of the railroad companies to success-
fully build the lines and pay off bondholders. As a result, 
when the bonds were first issued, they had trouble 
selling in New York, and according to numerous 
newspaper accounts, they continued to sell poorly even 
after Minnesota's governor made a special trip to New 
York on their behalf in December 1858.
5 
Under the market price valuation provision of the 
state's original law, Minnesota 7s could not have been 
used to back free bank notes because the bonds had not 
been sold in New York. No value for them had been 
established. Under the current valuation loophole, 
however, the bonds could be used as backing for notes 
once a current value was established. 
According to the Minnesota governor, the current 
value of Minnesota 7s was established in spring 1859, 
when a sale of Minnesota 7s was reported in St. Paul. 
On March 10, 1859, the private banking company
6 of 
Pease and Chalfant advertised in the Pioneer and 
Democrat that it had Minnesota railroad bonds for 
sale—bonds it had purchased for 95 cents on the 
dollar—that could be used at that price to open a bank. 
The governor authorized the state auditor to accept 
state railroad bonds as backing for notes at 95 cents on 
the dollar, basing his authorization on the Pease and 
Chalfant purchase price and on the belief that the state 
must support its own bonds. Only two weeks after the 
Pease and Chalfant advertisement appeared, the 
Pioneer and Democrat reported that Minnesota 7s had 
sold (or were hypothecated) in Chicago at discounts of 
50 percent and more. 
Minnesota Railroad Banks as Mutual Funds: 
An Interpretation 
That railroad bonds could back free bank notes is 
central to understanding Minnesota's experience 
during the Free Banking Era. The low rates of return on 
free bank notes calculated in Table 4 arise primarily 
from the low redemption rates on notes backed solely 
by railroad bonds. As shown in Table 5, the first five 
banks listed, which failed in the summer of 1859 (when 
the railroad companies failed), backed their notes with 
Minnesota 7s; the redemption rates on the notes of these 
banks were no higher than 21.25 cents on the dollar. So 
what needs to be explained for Minnesota is why people 
were willing to hold notes that were backed by such 
risky assets. 
5Consider this passage from the New York Tribune of December 17, 1858, 
that was reprinted December 30 in one of the two major St. Paul, Minnesota, 
newspapers, the weekly Pioneer and Democrat: 
The Governor of Minnesota is in town for the purpose of consulting with the 
managers of the four great Minnesota roads, and assisting them in 
negotiating the State bonds issued in aid of their undertakings It will be 
found, probably, difficult to negotiate in this market, these railroad State 
bonds, as no provision has been made by law for the payment, and it is 
unlikely that a new State of only 250,000 inhabitants could pay a sufficient 
tax, even if the law existed for collecting it. 
6Private banks, sometimes referred to as brokers, differed from free banks 
in that they were not subject to any banking law and could not issue notes. 
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Demand for Free Bank Notes 
The conventional view is that the public were either 
naive or misinformed. They simply accepted all free 
bank notes as perfectly safe claims to specie. Our 
interpretation is that the notes of these five railroad 
banks, as they were called, were demanded because 
they were initially issued below par and then exchanged 
below par, presumably at prices which reflected those 
of the Minnesota 7s against which they were claims.
7 
In effect, we are arguing that the railroad banks were 
acting as mutual funds by intermediating the large-
denomination ($1,000) railroad bonds; the bank notes 
served as shares in the fund. 
The demand for such intermediation is not hard to 
explain. Considering that in 1859 annual wages of 
agricultural workers in the United States ranged from 
$108 to $200 (Bigelow 1862, p. 213), a $1,000 bond 
even discounted 50 percent would have been an 
unlikely investment for most individuals. Purchasing 
the bank notes of railroad banks was the only way the 
general public could share in the capital gains possible 
if the railroads were successful and the railroad bonds 
appreciated in value. 
The supply of such intermediation is not as easy to 
explain. The incentive to supply any intermediation, of 
course, is the profit to be earned from performing it. The 
incentive to establish the intermediary in the form of a 
free bank came from the services which the state freely 
provided, such as holding the fund's collateral, monitor-
ing its activities, and printing its shares. Nonetheless, 
establishing a mutual fund under Minnesota's free 
banking law could have been very costly. The extended 
stockholder liability, first lien, and par redemption 
provisions of the law posed potential problems for a 
bank trying to issue notes below par since they could 
have created a strong incentive for the holders of such 
notes to attempt to redeem them for specie at par. 
This incentive is illustrated by the balance sheet of a 
hypothetical railroad bank shown in Table 6. It is 
constructed under the assumptions that a banker 
deposited $50,000 par value of railroad bonds, received 
$47,500 of notes from the auditor in return, and lent the 
notes to the public. Under Minnesota's free banking 
law, holders of notes of this bank would have a claim on 
assets worth $197,500 in nominal value—$97,500 
because the first lien provision would give them a first 
lien on all of the assets of the bank and an additional 
$100,000 because the extended liability provision 
would give them a claim to owners' wealth equal to 
twice the value of capital. Now suppose that this bank 
initially issued its notes at, say, a 50 percent discount. 
Then, unless the $197,500 in assets discussed above 
had a market value of $23,750 or less, there would be 
an incentive for holders of notes to present them for 
redemption to receive a certain gain. 
In the face of such obvious arbitrage opportunities, 
how could a free bank operating as a mutual fund 
survive? We argue that Minnesota's railroad banks 
were deliberately set up to avoid these problems. First, 
even though these banks were established by St. Paul 
brokers who would have a natural advantage in circu-
lating the railroad bank notes, they were established as 
independent affiliates with out-of-state owners. In this 
way the assets of the real owners (the brokers) would be 
protected from the extended liability provisions. 
Second, the loans made by the railroad banks were 
made only to the brokers. If these loans were only 
promises to pay back in notes of the bank and were not 
secured by any other collateral, the first lien provision 
would be circumvented and the only assets of the 
railroad bank would be the state bonds. 
We need, however, a third part to our explanation. 
For even though a free bank that was run as a mutual 
fund had no assets other than the railroad bonds, what 
prevented individuals from presenting the notes for par 
redemption in the hope that the railroad banker might 
want to avoid a protest and stay in business? We argue 
that since it was, obviously, not in the banker's interest 
to redeem notes at their face value when he could only 
sell them at a deep discount, his best policy was to 
ignore the par redemption requirement and to make this 
policy clear to the public. Moreover, if this policy was 
well known, he would not be risking protest and 
foreclosure since noteholders would have no incentive 
to force the issue. If they did, the best they could hope 
for was partial redemption based on the current market 
value of the railroad bonds held by the bank for the 
reasons given above. (Our explanation implies this 
liquidation value corresponded closely to the market 
price of the notes.) Thus, noteholders would gain 
7 Under the conventional view, when bonds used to secure free bank notes 
are selling well below par and the public naively accept all free bank notes at 
par, bankers can make a financial killing by getting their notes in circulation 
and then closing their doors and absconding with the bank's assets. Historians 
have colorfully labeled such banking practices wildcat banking. While our 
previous study (Rolnick and Weber 1984) found little actual evidence of 
wildcat banking in most states, we did find some evidence consistent with 
wildcatting in Minnesota. In particular, we found that five of the Minnesota free 
banks failed and paid noteholders as little as 16 cents on the dollar, secured their 
notes with bonds selling well below par, and were in business a very short time. 
In this paper, we take a closer look at the Minnesota experience in general and 
at these five banks in particular. In our view, which is elaborated below, this 
closer look indicates that these five banks could not have been wildcats; a 
necessary condition for wildcat banking—namely, that notes sold at par even 
though they were backed by bonds which sold well below par—was missing. 
27 Table 6 
Balance Sheet of a Hypothetical Railroad Bank 
(par values) 
Assets Liabilities and Capital 
State Bonds $50,000 Liabilities: 
Notes Outstanding $47,500 
Loans (to Brokers) 47,500 Capital 50,000 
Total $97,500 Total $97,500 
nothing by protesting the notes; they could more easily 
sell their notes to private brokers for roughly what they 
could receive from the liquidation sale. In addition, by 
protesting the notes and forcing the sale of the railroad 
bonds, they would be foregoing the possible capital 
gains if the railroads were successful and the bonds 
appreciated in value. 
Empirical Support for the Mutual Fund Interpretation 
We now examine the extent to which the available 
empirical evidence supports this mutual fund interpreta-
tion of Minnesota's free banking experience. First, we 
demonstrate that the balance sheets of the five railroad 
banks correspond closely to that of the hypothetical 
bank in Table 6. We also list their out-of-state owners 
and establish their connections with St. Paul brokers. 
Then we show that the public were well informed both 
about the valu^of the railroad bonds and about which 
banks used these bonds to back their notes. Finally, we 
present evidence supporting our conjecture that the 
notes of these banks were issued below par and priced 
to reflect their backing. 
• Bank Balance Sheets 
To varying degrees, the Bank of Owatonna, the 
Chisago County Bank, the Bank of Rochester, and the 
Fillmore County Bank all fit our description of a bank 
only in business to intermediate railroad bonds. The 
Exchange Bank of Glencoe differs slightly from these 
others, but it still fits our mutual fund interpretation. 
The Bank of Owatonna. The Bank of Owatonna 
looks the most like our hypothetical railroad bank. It 
appears to have been in business solely to intermediate 
railroad bonds for a well-known St. Paul broker. 
The balance sheets in Table 7 clearly reveal the 
limited nature of this bank's business. The bank opened 
in March 1859 with $28,000 of state bonds deposited 
with the auditor. The April balance sheet shows that 
$24,000 of the notes it received were sent to banks and 
brokers. No loans or discounts were made. The July 
balance sheet shows that even though capital and bonds 
deposited with the auditor increased, the additional 
notes received were also sent to banks and brokers, not 
used to discount paper or make loans. The Bank of 
Owatonna, therefore, was very much like our hypothet-
ical railroad bank. 
The Bank of Owatonna also had out-of-state owners 
while appearing to have been an independent affiliate 
of a prominent St. Paul private banker. According to a 
state auditor's ledger, the bank's stockholders at the 
time of opening were William E. Burlock and John L. 
Hathaway of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. However, this 
bank seems to have had very close ties with R. M. S. 
Pease of Pease and Chalfant, the St. Paul private 
banking company already mentioned as advertising 
railroad bonds. On June 23, 1859, shortly before the 
bank closed, an article in the Pioneer and Democrat 
stated that "the Bank of Owatonna and the Chisago 
County Bank are the bantlings of Messrs. North and 
Pease." Furthermore, in July, when Minnesota's auditor 
first began to exchange state bonds for Owatonna notes, 
Pease and his cashier, A. S. Babcock, were the first to 
exchange a large amount of Owatonna notes, which 
suggests they were the brokers for this bank and 
perhaps the actual owners. 
The Chisago County Bank The Chisago County 
Bank was another of the "bantlings" of North and 
Pease. It, too, looks very much like our hypothetical 
railroad bank operated as a mutual fund. 
The balance sheets in Table 8 reveal the limited 
nature of Chisago's activities. The bank opened in 
March 1859 with $34,000 of state bonds. By April, it 
had been issued $24,800 of notes of which $19,200 
were sent to banks and brokers. The rest of the notes 
were either swapped with other banks or listed as other 
assets. Only $400 of loans were made. The July balance 
sheet is even more revealing. It shows no loans, 
discounts, or specie. The only assets were notes sent to 
banks and brokers and $2,100 of other assets, presum-
ably the bank's own notes. Capital in July was listed as 
equal to the stock deposited with the auditor. Chisago 
was obviously only in the business of intermediating 
state bonds. 
We found a close connection between Pease and this 
bank. Even though Charles F. Willard of Chicago was 
listed as the stockholder at the time of opening, the 
Pioneer and Democrat on March 10,1859, reported that 
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Tables 7-10 
Balance Sheets of Minnesota Railroad Banks 
Table 7 Bank of Owatonna Table 8 Chisago County Bank 
Item  April 1859  July 1859  Item  April 1859  July 1859 
Assets  Assets 
State Bonds  $28,000  $41,000  State Bonds  $34,000  $36,000 
Due From Banks and Brokers  24,100  33,700  Due From Banks and Brokers  19,200  30,200 
Loans and Discounts  0  0  Loans and Discounts  400  0 
Bills of Solvent Banks  1,900  0  Bills of Solvent Banks  2,300  0 
Specie  500  0  Specie  1,900  0 
Other  900  1,300  Other  1,100  2,100 
Total Assets  $55,400  $76,000  Total Assets  $58,900  $68,300 
Liabilities  Liabilities 
Notes Outstanding  $24,000  $35,000  Notes Outstanding  $24,800  $32,300 
Other  3,400  6,000  Other  9,100  0 
Total Liabilities  $27,400  $41,000  Total Liabilities  $33,900  $32,300 
Capital  $28,000  $35,000  Capital  $25,000  $36,000 
Total Liabilities and Capital  $55,400  $76,000  Total Liabilities and Capital  $58,900  $68,300 
Table 9 Fillmore County Bank  Table 10  Exchange Bank of Glencoe 
July 1859 
Item  July 1859  Item  Jan. 1859  April 1859  * July 1859  (adjusted)** 
Assets  Assets 
State Bonds  $50,000  State Bonds  $25,000  $53,000  $70,000  $69,000 
Due From Banks and Brokers  4,850  Due From Banks and Brokers  13,200  6,300  12,100  12,100 
Loans and Discounts  250  Loans and Discounts  0  1,100  8,400  250 
Bills of Solvent Banks  17,500  Bills of Solvent Banks  0  4,000  6,900  6,900 
Specie  1,600  Specie  9,500  7,000  2,100  2,100 
Other  800  Other  2,300  500  400  400 
Total Assets  $75,000  Total Assets  $50,000  $71,900  $99,900  $90,750 
Liabilities  Liabilities 
Notes Outstanding  $25,000  Notes Outstanding  $25,000  $47,000  $49,100  $65,750 
Other  0  Other  0  0  800  0 
Total Liabilities  $25,000  Total Liabilities  $25,000  $47,000  $49,900  $65,750 
Capital  $50,000  Capital  $25,000  $25,000  $50,000  $25,000 
Total Liabilities and Capital  $75,000  Total Liabilities and Capital  $50,000  $72,0001" $99,900  $90,750 
*0mits $25,000 of state bonds not deposited with auditor and $50,000 due from directors; capital reduced by that amount. 
"Adjusted to be consistent with state bonds deposited and notes issued, as given by state auditor's ledger. 
fTotal Assets not equal to Total Liabilities and Capital due to rounding. 
29 Pease had recently established the Chisago County 
Bank. Further, Pease is listed by the state auditor as one 
of the two "bondsmen" for this bank. And, just as with 
the Bank of Owatonna, shortly after Chisago closed, 
Pease and his cashier Babcock exchanged a large 
amount of the bank's notes for state bonds. 
The Bank of Rochester. The Bank of Rochester was 
yet another Pease-sponsored bank. While we found no 
balance sheet statements on Rochester, the pattern of its 
note issue in the state auditor's ledger strongly suggests 
that it operated very much like Owatonna and Chisago. 
Rochester was first issued notes on April 20, 1859. 
At that time, the president and owner of the bank was 
listed as William Harwood of Joliet, Illinois. According 
to the April 28, 1859, Rochester Free Press; however, 
Harwood bought $27,000 of Minnesota 7s from Pease 
in order to establish a bank. The paper went on to say it 
considered the bank "only a nominal affair." And once 
again, when the Bank of Rochester failed, Pease and his 
cashier were the first to redeem a large number of the 
failed bank's notes for state bonds. 
The Fillmore County Bank. The Fillmore County 
Bank also appears to have functioned as a railroad bond 
mutual fund with close ties to a St. Paul broker—but not 
Pease. 
Fillmore was opened in late May 1859 by William R. 
Marshall, an owner of Marshall and Company, which 
was a St. Paul private banking firm. Fillmore lasted 
barely two months, but as the one available balance 
sheet in Table 9 indicates, it was in business solely to 
intermediate railroad bonds. The balance sheet was 
reported in July 1859 and listed $50,000 of bonds but 
only $25,000 of notes issued against these bonds. 
According to this record, most of the notes had been 
traded for notes of other banks. However, since most of 
the Fillmore notes were eventually returned to the 
auditor by Marshall, we suspect this entry represents 
notes which did not get into circulation. Only $4,850 
was sent to the main office in St. Paul. Fillmore had 
$1,600 of specie, but a mere $250 of loans and 
discounts. 
Therefore, this bank—like Owatonna, Chisago, and 
Rochester—was in the banking business in only a very 
limited way. It was essentially only intermediating 
railroad bonds, and it presumably was using its main 
office to help sell at least part of its notes. 
The Exchange Bank of Glencoe. The Exchange 
Bank of Glencoe operated somewhat differently than 
the other four railroad banks described. While 
Exchange also appears to have been in business to 
intermediate railroad bonds, its connection was not 
with St. Paul brokers but rather with the railroad 
company whose bonds it was intermediating. 
The Exchange Bank was one of the first free banks to 
operate in Minnesota. It was opened in November 1858 
by two brothers, Daniel and Lawrence Graham, who 
initially deposited $25,000 face value of the Cedar 
Valley Railroad Company bonds with the state auditor. 
That Exchange owned Cedar Valley bonds is not 
surprising. Earlier in the year, [Lawrence] Graham, 
MacDonald, and Company was hired as an indepen-
dent contractor for that railroad and was paid with 
railroad bonds (Memorial of Graham, MacDonald and 
Company 1860). And so we find that between January 
and July 1859, the Exchange Bank deposited $45,000 
more of the Cedar Valley bonds (using its notes to buy 
some of these bonds) and by July had issued somewhere 
between $49,000 and $66,000 of notes. 
As Exchange's balance sheets in Table 10 indicate, 
the bank did make some loans, but lending seems to 
have been a relatively small part of the business. Selling 
bank notes for railroad bonds appears to have been 
Exchange's main activity, and like the other railroad 
banks, it used brokers to help market its product.
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• Public Information on Railroad Bonds and Banks 
But what about the risk to the public? Did the public 
know that railroad banks were only mutual funds? Did 
they know that such notes were not promises to specie 
on demand but rather small-denomination securities 
whose value depended on the success or failure of the 
railroad companies? The evidence from the auditor 
records, legislative testimony, and newspaper accounts 
about these banks supports the contention that the 
public were more likely than not to have been very well 
informed about these banks. There was enough bad 
publicity about the railroad bonds and the banks that 
used these bonds to secure their notes that even the less 
well informed should have questioned accepting these 
bank notes at par. 
8That some of the railroad banks held specie reserves and that the amount 
of these reserves changed over time appears inconsistent with our hypothetical 
railroad bank of Table 6. Positive and changing specie reserves, however, do 
not necessarily imply either the intent of a railroad bank to redeem or the actual 
redemption of notes for specie at par. We suspect that the changes which did 
occur were in fact due to transactions with St. Paul brokers, not with 
noteholders. Further, a comparison of the balance sheets of the railroad banks 
with those of other Minnesota banks of that time (some of which also had their 
notes backed with Minnesota 7s) shows that the other banks on average had 
higher specie/note ratios and made virtually no loans to brokers. Thus, the 
railroad banks appear to be quantitatively different from the other banks of that 
time, and different in a way consistent with our argument that they behaved as 
mutual funds. 
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Minnesota's newspapers closely followed the fate of 
the railroad bonds, beginning with the governor's trip to 
New York in December 1858. Articles discussing sales 
of bonds in New York appeared in the Minnesotian, the 
other major St. Paul newspaper, on January 4 and 
February 8, 1859. The Pioneer and Democrat reported 
on February 10, 1859, that "at this writing nothing 
definite has been received relative to the sale of our 
State Railroad Bonds in New York." 
As it turned out, the newspapers never could report 
any New York sales. In addition, the Minnesotian ran an 
article on March 12, 1859, by J. Jay Knox, a St. Paul 
banker, who quoted from the Chicago Press and Tribune 
of February 17,1859, that "some varieties of [railroad 
bonds]... are tho't to be worth not more than fifty cents 
on the dollar." The Pioneer and Democrat on March 24, 
1859, also reported how slightly Chicago investors 
valued Minnesota 7s: "The bonds have been frequently 
pledged in Chicago at fifty cents on the dollar." On 
March 30, 1859, the Minnesotian again questioned the 
value of the bonds by again quoting the Chicago press: 
"Our readers remember that the same bonds are now 
being hawked around the Eastern cities without finding 
purchasers at 50 percent discount." 
Therefore, from the beginning the public appear to 
have been well informed about the nature of the 
railroad bonds: The $5 million loan was ratified in a 
well-publicized election. The state's obligations were 
debated and clarified in numerous newspaper accounts. 
The railroad companies' difficulty in marketing their 
bonds was publicly recorded and commented on. And 
the value of these bonds was questioned soon after they 
were issued and well before most of the railroad banks 
opened. 
The public also knew which banks were using 
railroad bonds to secure their notes and which were 
using safer bonds. Both the local and the St. Paul press 
regularly reported openings of free banks. These 
reports included the type of bond the bank had used to 
secure its notes, the nominal value of its capital, and 
sometimes the names of its officers and owners. More 
important, newspapers warned the public repeatedly 
that notes secured by railroad bonds were not safe and 
should only sell at a discount. 
For example, the Exchange Bank of Glencoe's 
activities were covered by both the St. Paul press and 
the local community paper. When the Exchange Bank 
began to issue notes in November 1858, the financial 
section of the Pioneer and Democrat reported how its 
notes had different backing than those of the other 
recently opened free bank, the Bank of the State of 
Minnesota (which had deposited Minnesota 8s—bonds 
fully backed by state taxes, unlike Minnesota 7s—with 
the auditor). Further, on January 29, 1859, the Glencoe 
Register published the Exchange Bank's quarterly report 
that had been submitted to the state auditor. The report 
included the $25,000 in state railroad bonds backing 
the bank's $25,000 of notes and listed a high percent-
age of its assets as due from banks and brokers. In 
mid-March, both papers reported that the owners of 
Exchange had increased the bank's capital and note 
issue $25,000 by depositing this amount of railroad 
bonds with the state auditor. 
The press also identified the four railroad banks that 
opened in the first half of 1859. The Pioneer and 
Democrat reported on March 10 and again on March 
17, 1859, that the Chisago County Bank had been 
opened by Pease with Minnesota 7s securing the note 
issue. On April 16,1859, the Minnesotian published an 
article related to the Bank of Owatonna which included 
the amount of Minnesota 7s deposited with the auditor. 
On April 28, 1859, the Rochester Free Press reported 
that Pease had sold $27,000 of Minnesota 7s to William 
Harwood to establish the Bank of Rochester. And the 
Pioneer and Democrat reported on May 5,1859, that the 
Rochester bank had $30,000 of Minnesota 7s securing 
an issue of $23,000 notes. The same article listed the 
capital and notes in circulation of the existing Minne-
sota banks, including Owatonna, Chisago, Rochester, 
and Exchange. The opening of the last railroad bank, 
the Fillmore County Bank, was noted on June 2, 1859, 
in the Pioneer and Democrat; which reported it to have 
capital of $25,000 of notes secured by Minnesota 7s. 
Some of the newspaper accounts, especially those in 
the Pioneer and Democrat, supported these banks and 
viewed the Minnesota 7s as ample security for note 
issue. They tended to blame the Eastern press and a 
group of St. Paul brokers for trying to discredit what 
they believed was a sound currency system. 
Nevertheless, the free banks that secured their notes 
with railroad bonds got enough negative attention from 
the press to make the public at least suspect that such 
banks were not as safe as other free banks in Minnesota. 
Willard & Morris' Bank Note Reporter of Chicago, for 
example, warned its readers about Minnesota's banks in 
an article that the Pioneer and Democrat passed on to its 
readers on December 9, 1858, well before most of the 
railroad banks even opened. 
It was feared that the [Bank of the State of Minnesota] 
would be started based on the Railroad Bonds, but we 
doubt if any one would be foolish enough to expect 
currency to circulate based on such security as that. We 
31 warn the people of Minnesota against it, if they do not wish 
to suffer the evils of a depreciated and dangerous currency. 
If the Auditor of Minnesota will exercise a little discretion 
which as an officer he must have the power to do, and will 
deny admittance to any but first rate securities, there is no 
reason why Minnesota currency should not be as good as 
Illinois and Wisconsin. 
At the same time, the Pioneer and Democrat reported 
that Thompson's Note Detector of New York had also 
warned its readers against any Minnesota currency 
based on railroad bonds. Further, on March 17, 1859, 
shortly after the Chisago County Bank had opened, the 
Pioneer and Democrat again reported that Chicago 
brokers were critical of notes secured by Minnesota 7s, 
and in the Minnesotian on March 12, J. Jay Knox argued 
that the railroad bonds should not be valued by the 
auditor at more than 75 cents on the dollar if the state 
was to have a safe currency. 
A case can be made, therefore, that through a 
plethora of newspaper coverage the Minnesota public 
were warned well in advance that bank notes secured 
by railroad bonds were worth far less than their face 
value. They were warned by brokers and financial 
interests in New York and Chicago, as well as those in 
their own cities. The warnings were very much like 
what the Rochester Free Press said about its local bank: 
it was but a "nominal affair." 
• Railroad Bank Note Prices 
Since railroad banks were only nominal affairs and 
since the public appeared to be well informed, notes 
backed by railroad bonds should have been discounted. 
Although we have not been able to find explicit 
currency prices, we have found substantial circumstan-
tial evidence that railroad bank notes were generally 
exchanged below par, presumably because of their 
risky backing. 
Banks securing their notes with railroad bonds seem 
to have gotten their notes into circulation by exchang-
ing them for more railroad bonds or for loans from 
St. Paul brokers. In either case, it can be argued that in 
the first round these notes were circulated below par. 
When the notes were used to buy more railroad bonds, 
they presumably exchanged for the nominal price 
rather than the market price, since it was only the 
nominal value of the bonds which backed the notes. 
Thus, in this case the notes were discounted by the ratio 
of the market price to the nominal price of the bonds. 
When the notes were loaned to brokers, the loans were 
presumably only secured by promises to pay back the 
bank notes. Notes circulated in this way were obviously 
discounted by the same amount as those used to buy 
more bonds. 
Thus, at least in the first round when notes entered 
circulation, they do not seem to have been valued at par. 
They appear to have been sold by bankers for assets of 
equal real value. But, what about later rounds? Did the 
initial noteholders find unsuspecting buyers? The evi-
dence suggests that they did not; in the second and 
additional rounds, railroad bank notes appear to have 
been discounted heavily.
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According to a report to the Minnesota Senate by a 
special committee on railroads and railroad grants, 
dated February 3, 1860, railroad contractors had been 
paid with state railroad bonds at prices well above the 
actual cost of their services. Engineers reporting to this 
committee estimated that the cost of grading roads was 
no more than $2,500 per mile. Yet, based on the 
number of bonds paid to these companies, the com-
mittee concluded that the companies were paid about 
$4.50 of bonds for every $ 1.00 of road graded; that is, 
bonds had been used as payment at about 22 percent of 
their nominal value. 
As previously discussed, contractors for the Cedar 
Valley Railroad Company were paid in Minnesota 7s, 
which they in turn sold for Exchange Bank of Glencoe 
notes. According to the special committee's report, 
Exchange notes were then used to pay the railroad 
workers. The question then becomes, did the workers 
willingly accept notes instead of specie at going wages, 
or did the wage rate get adjusted to reflect the means of 
payment? While we have been unable to find an explicit 
wage series to answer this question, we have found 
evidence suggesting that the wages of workers were 
adjusted accordingly. 
Some evidence on wages is found in the special 
committee's report, which contains this statement on 
railroad salaries (Minnesota Senate 1860, p. 344): "The 
companies since the passage of the loan amendment... 
have paid extravagant salaries to incompetent or 
inefficient officers." So at least some salaries were quite 
high, but very likely they were only high in nominal 
terms. That is, officers were being paid in railroad 
currency, and the salaries were adjusted as we suspect. 
If officers' salaries were adjusted, other wages and 
9The memorial of Ferdinand Becker and others (Minnesota House of 
Representatives 1860, pp. 407-8), whose authors were "holders of a large 
amount of the circulating notes of the Exchange Bank of Glencoe," reports that 
the owners of this bank "palmed off" a great amount of their notes "upon an 
unsuspecting people." However, no supporting evidence is offered, and the 
authors of this memorial were clearly a group of individuals with much to gain if 
their claim was accepted. 
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salaries also may have been. The inflated construction 
costs are consistent with this interpretation. 
Other evidence on wage rates is the lack in the 
Minnesota newspapers of any criticism of the use of 
railroad currency to pay railroad workers. Even if the 
workers thought this money was good as gold, the press 
knew differently. The Minnesotian, in particular, had 
been one of the strongest critics of the $5 million 
railroad loan and the railroad banks. If workers had 
been so naive as to accept these notes at par—an 
acceptance resulting in a windfall for the railroad 
contractors—surely the Minnesotian would have ex-
posed the scam. And surely workers, eventually realiz-
ing they had been grossly underpaid, would have 
complained. But instead, neither this newspaper nor the 
Pioneer and Democrat mentioned a scam or complaints 
by railroad workers, who continued to grade roads well 
into the summer of 1859. This silence is consistent with 
a wage to railroad workers that was adjusted to the 
means of payment. 
Further evidence suggests that railroad workers 
were not alone in heavily discounting free bank notes 
secured by railroad bonds; they were joined by the 
public at large. We know that most of the notes went 
from the issuing bank to a broker in St. Paul. And, again, 
while we do not have explicit prices, the evidence we do 
have strongly refutes the idea that brokers sold these 
notes for anything close to par. 
As early as April 1859, a series of articles in the 
Minnesotian revealed the status of railroad notes. These 
notes were reported to be difficult to redeem at 
"reasonable rates" from brokers. For example, M. E. 
Ames, a St. Paul attorney, reported his experience on 
April 11 and 16,1859. He said he had received $200 of 
Owatonna notes from a "respectable Banker of this 
City." (Ames did not say, however, what he paid for 
these notes, so that it cannot be assumed that he 
purchased them at par.) Trying, then, to purchase $125 
of exchange on New York (New York bank notes), he 
said he could not find a bank that would make such a 
trade "at any price." Since New York exchange was 
roughly selling at par, the implication is that Owatonna 
money was selling for less than 63 cents on the dollar.
1
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Now if St. Paul brokers were heavily discounting 
these notes, then merchants, workers, and the rest of the 
public probably were too. More important, St. Paul 
brokers were discounting railroad notes in mid-April 
1859, before more than half of the railroad notes had 
even been issued. Thus, brokers selling these notes after 
March were unlikely to have passed off very many of 
them as a safe currency. 
By the time all the notes had been issued, the public 
should have been aware that these railroad bank notes 
were not safe. Consider the following report dated May 
31, 1859, which appeared in the Pioneer and Democrat 
two days later: 
The notes of Minnesota country banks are freely offered 
by purchasers of goods, but as such notes are issued at 
inaccessible points, and, with one or two exceptions, are 
not convertible into coin or exchange in St. Paul, except at 
ruinous rates of discount, Merchants are very loth to part 
with their goods for funds which cannot be used, and thus 
trade is temporarily seriously affected. 
Two Other Supporting Arguments 
For those readers who remain unconvinced by the 
above evidence supporting our interpretation of Minne-
sota's free banking experience, we offer two additional 
supporting arguments. The first is related to the timing 
of the railroad bank closings. The railroad banks that 
had opened by the spring of 1859 all closed shortly after 
the railroad companies failed in the early summer of 
1859; other free banks stayed open well past the 
summer of 1859. The timing of the railroad bank 
closings is consistent with our mutual fund interpre-
tation. Once the railroad bond outcome was realized, 
the fund no longer had a reason to exist, and so it was 
liquidated. 
The second argument is related to the ultimate 
payoff to noteholders. On June 1, 1860, Minnesota's 
state auditor published in the Pioneer and Democrat the 
prices at which he would redeem railroad notes. It was 
a very short announcement simply stating that the 
auditor of the state of Minnesota would redeem the 
bank notes of the Bank of Rochester, the Exchange 
Bank of Glencoe, the Bank of Owatonna, and the 
Fillmore County Bank at the very low rates of roughly 
20 cents on the dollar. Surprisingly, in that issue and 
subsequent ones of the Pioneer and Democrat, we could 
not find even one feature story, editorial, letter to the 
editor, or other reference to the auditor's action. No one 
criticized the auditor or the governor of Minnesota. No 
one asked for the bank owners to make good on their 
legal liabilities. And no one sued. In other words, there 
was no outcry from the public, the ones who had 
supposedly been fooled into accepting railroad notes as 
a safe currency. If railroad notes were actually taken at 
10Ames eventually took his notes to Pease who, as Ames knew, was the 
Owatonna broker. With some difficulty, Ames persuaded Pease to buy the notes 
for St. Paul city scrip, but could get neither New York exchange or gold out of 
Pease. 
33 par by an unsuspecting public, this silence is very hard 
to explain. 
A Caveat 
The evidence we have presented is consistent with our 
mutual fund interpretation of the Minnesota free 
banking experience. Nonetheless, we recognize that we 
have not proven our case. Since we have been unable to 
uncover definitive bank or broker records showing 
whether or not the notes of railroad banks were initially 
issued at par and whether or not the railroad banks 
redeemed outstanding notes for specie at par until they 
closed, our interpretation must remain somewhat 
speculative. And it would have to be rejected if future 
research were to uncover evidence that the railroad 
bank notes were initially issued at par, that railroad 
banks redeemed their notes for specie at par, or that 
Minnesota railroad workers in 1859 were paid wages in 
railroad bank notes which were equivalent to wages 
paid in specie or good bank notes elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, our finding of an exceptional experi-
ence in Minnesota is important, for regardless of how 
pervasive the mutual fund organization was during the 
Free Banking Era, the implications go beyond this 
period. Clearly an incentive exists for the public to 
obtain information on the backing of any liability a 
bank should issue. They should not naively accept a 
bank liability at par. We find this was true in the Free 
Banking Era and suspect it has always been true. To 
assume otherwise—that is, to assume the public ignore 
the backing of bank liabilities—will likely lead to 
serious misinterpretation of any banking arrangement. 
Summary and Implications 
We have examined the question of why free bank notes 
were demanded even when they appear to have been 
dominated by gold and silver coins. The conventional 
answer is that the public were either naive or mis-
informed. They accepted free bank notes at par even 
when the notes were risky. 
We proposed an alternative answer that assumed the 
public were well informed and found that the empirical 
evidence from four free banking states was generally 
more consistent with it. Specifically, we argued that the 
demand for free bank notes depended on the expected 
value of their backing. We found that in New York, 
Wisconsin, and Indiana the expected value of the 
backing was sufficient for free bank notes to circulate at 
par, which they did. In Minnesota we found that the 
backing for the notes of the so-called railroad banks 
was very poor and that contrary to the conventional 
view, these bank notes exchanged well below par, being 
treated as small-denomination securities. 
We suspect that the free banking experience of New 
York, Indiana, and Wisconsin was the rule and that the 




 That is, most free banks were intended to be 
banks, not mutual funds. They started with notes fully 
covered by assets, issued their notes at par, and 
redeemed their notes at par in specie on demand. They 
failed when they stopped redeeming notes due to a fall 
in the value of their assets and it was in the noteholders' 
interest to protest the notes and close the bank. 
1
1
 Michigan may provide another case of free banks acting as mutual funds 
rather than banks. In Michigan (a state whose historical bank records we were 
unable to examine closely because most had been destroyed by fire) an 
amendment to the free banking law of 1837 was passed less than three months 
after the law was enacted. The amendment suspended the requirement of par 
redemption in specie and thus legally turned all of Michigan's free banks into 
mutual funds before they even went into operation. The extent to which 
Michigan's free bank notes were initially discounted, though, is unknown. 
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